After rushing off to do some towing the other day, I now have time to put some comments down in enk (electronic ink). First, here is the link to the NTSB one page synopsis of the pending full accident report (which is due out in a few weeks):
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2011/sandiego_ca/synopsis.html
The NTSB clearly lays the blame for this tragedy entirely on the US Coast Guard:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause of the collision between the CG 33118 and the Sea Ray was the failure of the CG 33118 crew to see and avoid the Sea Ray because of the excessive speed at which the coxswain operated the CG 33118, given the prevailing darkness, background lighting, and high vessel density and the U.S. Coast Guard’s lack of effective oversight of its small boat operations both nationally and at Coast Guard Station San Diego.
from the coxswain to the station brass and right up to the national level. Lack of oversight is not a phrase that will increase chances of promotion for those in charge of USCG Station San Diego, and the NTSB report will make it very hard for those at command level to shirk their burden of responsibility.
To refresh your memory, CG 33118 (a 33′ RIB) was responding to a report of a grounded boat inside San Diego Bay, and at one point was doing ~42kts through a dark harbor full of spectator boats after a Christmas boat parade. They hit a small boat en route to the grounding and one person died as a result of the collision
Since the accident, much of the news coming out of the investigation focused on the use of cell phones as a possible contributing factor (see my post here). Interestingly, now that the investigation is complete, that is now just one of fifteen contributing factors. #2 on the list caught my attention:
The vessel grounding to which the CG 33118 responded was not an emergency and did not necessitate a high-speed response that reached 42 knots at one point. (boldface added)
This point is where the entire topic fetches up, and I think even the NTSB failed to fully illuminate the issue. The real question is not why was the USCG rushing to a grounded boat in Harbor Island Lagoon, but why were they responding at all? The record shows that the grounded sailor stated he was in no danger, and a MARB was broadcast from USCGSD. The policy is very clear on this, and states that for non-emergency cases, the USCG will find other sources of assistance. Why was 33118 even heading in that direction in contradiction of stated USCG policy?
Has the CG become bureaucratically predisposed to treat every single case as an emergency; anxious to bask in the headlines? (see previous post here) Perhaps, but I don’t think so. I fear something even more insidious is going on. The trend I have seen is for the CG to jump on low risk cases, like grounded sailboats in protected harbors, while at the same time, the SAR commanders actually avoid high risk cases where a mishap would have them called before a Captain’s Mast, or even jeopardize their career.
I know, you’re thinking “give ‘em a break” and “it’s an isolated case, Doug. You’re blowing it out of proportion.” Am I?
Allow me to illustrate a startling contrast to the above with a recent personal experience with the Coast Guard Sector New England. About two weeks ago, I relieved a commercial fisherman who was towing a disabled 55′ Viking sportfisher from the offshore fishing grounds. The Viking had suffered a small electric fire and one of their crew had been injured during the melee of firefighting. He had a badly lacerated upper lip, two missing front teeth and cut gums. The crew of the Viking had requested that the USCG arrange an evacuation of the injured party so he could get immediate medical attention on the mainland, while I was going to tow the Viking to the mainland. The tow was going to take about 3.5 hours.
After numerous phone calls from our office, we were informed that the USCG “has declined a medivac” for this situation. WTF?!? The seas were calm and the victim was ambularoty; all they needed to do was send a fast boat to rendezvous with us. The owner of the Viking finally phoned a personal friend with a fast RIB to come out 18 miles and meet us to take his injured crew to shore. Somehow, I don’t think you’ll see that case in the USCG news feed…
So, on the one hand, we have the USCG actually killing an 8 year old boy while they rush to the scene of a non-emergency grounding when no request for assistance was made; and on the other hand, the USCG refuses to comply with a request to evacuate a rather serverly injured boater.
The USCG has become a dysfunctional bureaucracy plagued by inconsistent decisions and a command structure that circumvents accountability. You might not agree with me, but the National Transportation Safety Board does.
